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STUDENT NOTES

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT GOT IT WRONG: SUPERVISORS SHOULD
NOT FACE INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 1981
EMILY ALEISA *
INTRODUCTION
In June 2009, a man named Darrel Smith brought an action against his
former employer alleging that in violation of section 1981 he was subjected
to racial discrimination and retaliation. 1 His case involved discriminatory
acts committed by his supervisor and the manager of his employer’s human
resources department. 2 Unfortunately for Smith, his employer went through
bankruptcy and was subsequently rendered judgment-proof. 3 So Smith
amended his original complaint to name both his supervisor and human
resources manager individually. 4
The Seventh Circuit had yet to determine whether supervisors like the
two named in Smith’s suit could face individual liability for retaliation
under section 1981. 5 In Smith v. Bray, the court decided the issue in the
affirmative: individual supervisors can and should be personally liable
under section 1981 for their acts of racial discrimination including retaliation. 6 The court did not go so far as to absolve the employer; it simply added individual supervisors as other potential defendants. 7
In three parts, this comment explains why Smith v. Bray was wrongly
decided. Part I examines the evolution of section 1981 from its origin over
a hundred years ago to its more recent application to cases of employment
discrimination. Part II explains how courts assign liability under section
1981 claims in the context of employment discrimination, specifically in
circumstances where a supervisor discriminates against an employee. Finally, Part III delineates four specific reasons why the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Smith v. Bray was incorrect. First, courts are supposed to analyze
* Law student, Chicago Kent College of Law Class of December 2013. The author would like to thank
Professor César F. Rosado Marzán for his invaluable insight and editorial assistance.
1. Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 895 (7th Cir. 2012).
2. Id. at 892
3. Id.
4. Id. at 895.
5. Id. at 899.
6. Id.
7. Id.
415
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section 1981 the same way they analyze Title VII, and Title VII does not
allow for individual supervisor liability. Second, the Seventh Circuit justified its decision based on a flawed comparison between section 1981 and
section 1983, a similar but distinct civil rights statute. Third, individual
supervisor liability for discrimination and retaliation conflicts with tort,
agency, and contract law—all of which create the framework for analyzing
section 1981 specifically and employment discrimination generally. Finally, individual supervisor liability results in overdeterrence likely to chill
supervisors from efficient, effective service to their employers.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF SECTION 1981: A VEHICLE FOR EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Section 1981 was a necessary building block of American civil rights.
Drafted nearly a century and a half ago, this statute has only passed through
the Supreme Court two dozen times. 8 Section 1981 demands that all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States enjoy equal benefits and
endure equal punishments under the law—regardless of race. 9 This significant edict of racial equality was born just after the Civil War, nestled into
the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 10
As a practicality of post-war reconstruction, Congress drafted section
1981 to help the newly freed black population buy land and make employment contracts. 11 By guaranteeing blacks the right to contract, the framers
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 attempted to bestow on them the fundamental rights of American citizenship. 12 Around the same time, Congress enacted the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, both of which reinforced
the Constitutional right to equality for the recently emancipated portion of
8. For a list of the cases, see generally Ann K. Wooster, Actions Brought Under 42 U.S.C.A
§§ 1981-1983 for Racial Discrimination—Supreme Court cases, 164 A.L.R. FED. 483 (2000).
9. Section 1981 of the U.S. Code states in relevant part: “All persons within the jurisdiction of
the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2013).
10. “This provision of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 was first codified as Revised Statutes § 1977,
then recodified as 8 U.S.C. § 41, then finally recodified as 42 U.S.C. § 1981. When § 1981 was amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the original § 1981 was renumerated ‘1981(a).’” Sections 1981(b)
and 1981(c), discussed below, were added in 1991. Joanna L. Grossman, Making a Federal Case Out of
It: Section 1981 and At-Will Employment, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 329, 380 n.7 (2001).
11. Aware that employers in the confederate states used the Black Codes to limit the rights and
opportunities of newly freed slaves, Congress drafted Section 1981 to challenge the status quo. See S.
EXEC. DOC. NO. 2-39, at 19-20 (1865).
12. See CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 599-600 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull)
(“[The bill is] intended to . . . guaranty to every person of every color the same civil rights . . . [A]ll its
provisions are aimed at the accomplishment of that one object.”).
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the populace. 13 Unfortunately, Congress’ good intentions remained little
more than intentions for over a hundred years, due in large part to the Supreme Court’s decision in the Civil Rights Cases. 14 There, the Court took
an extremely narrow view of Congress’ power to legislate against private
race discrimination. 15 Under that restrictive view, the two amendments—
along with federal laws regarding discrimination, like section 1981—
offered no protection against private acts of discrimination, including employment discrimination. 16
After a century of limited use, the Supreme Court finally flexed section 1981’s muscles by explicitly extending it into the employment discrimination law arena. First, in 1975, the Court in Johnson v. Railway
Express held that section 1981 applies to claims of employment discrimination, a conclusion that had already been reached by several federal courts of
appeals. 17 Relying on legislative history and common sense, those lower
courts already had concluded that the right to make and enforce contracts
necessarily and intentionally included employment contracts. 18 In Railway
Express, the Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of those lower courts
and applied section 1981 to employment contracts and employment discrimination. 19 Prior to Railway Express, Title VII had been the predomi-

13. The Thirteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part: “Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” U.S. Const. amend. XIII. The
Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
14. The Civil Rights Cases struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 because it reached private
conduct, which the Fourteenth Amendment did not give Congress authority to regulate. The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
15. Id. at 17-18 (holding the Fourteenth Amendment is not intended to protect individual rights
against individual invasion, but to nullify and make void all state legislation and state action which
impairs the privileges of citizens of the United States).
16. Two years after the Civil Rights Cases limited the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme
Court applied the same reasoning to limit the scope of the 1866 Act in Bowman v. Chicago & Nw. Ry.
Co. 115 U.S. 611, 615-16 (1885).
17. “Although this Court has not specifically so held, it is well settled among the federal Courts
of Appeals and we now join them—that s[ection] 1981 affords a federal remedy against discrimination
in private employment on the basis of race.” Johnson v. Ry. Exp. Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60
(1975).
18. See, e.g., Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500, 505 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding that the purpose for which section 1981 was enacted requires that a court adopt a broad outlook in its enforcement);
Young v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1971) (holding that “[i]n the context of the
Reconstruction it would be hard to imagine to what contract right the Congress was more likely to have
been referring”); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int’l. Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476, 483 (7th Cir.
1970) (holding that “[e]very indicia of congressional intent points to the conclusion that section 1981
was designed to prohibit private job discrimination”).
19. 421 U.S. at 459-60.
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nant path to recovery for racial discrimination.20 Initially drafted as part of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII protects against discrimination
based on race, much like section 1981. 21 However, Title VII is much more
expansive, also protecting against discrimination based on color, national
origin, religion, and sex. 22 The plaintiff in Railway Express filed suit under
both Title VII and section 1981. 23 In spite of its overlap with Title VII, the
Court considered section 1981 to be a distinct avenue for redress for racial
discrimination. 24
After temporarily expanding the reach of section 1981 in Railway Express, the Supreme Court soon scaled back the scope and power of the
statute in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, decided just 15 years later.25
In that landmark case, the Court held that while section 1981 applies to
employment contracts, it is limited to the making and enforcing of contracts. 26 The Court recognized that section 1981 discrimination claims
could certainly deal with post-hire—and thus post-formation—conduct.27
Nevertheless, the Court ultimately rejected the notion that the statute applied to the employer’s conduct after the contract was formed, including
any acts of discrimination that potentially breached the terms of the contract. 28 Thus construed, Patterson severely limited section 1981’s application to employment discrimination claims. Under the restrictive holding in
Patterson, failure to promote, failure to transfer, retaliation, termination,
and any number of acts based on race that occur throughout the employment relationship would fall outside the scope of section 1981.
In response to Patterson, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of
1991. 29 Among other changes, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 added section
1981(b), which states: “[f]or purposes of this section, the term ‘make and
enforce contracts’ includes the making, performance, modification, and

20. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 985 n.3 (1991) (Title VII claims represented roughly 80% of
total employment discrimination claims between 1969–1989).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2013).
22. Id.
23. 421 U.S. at 456.
24. “We generally conclude, therefore, that the remedies available under Title VII and under
s[ection] 1981, although related, and although directed to most of the same ends, are separate, distinct,
and independent.” Id. at 461.
25. 491 U.S. 164, 171 (1989).
26. Id. at 172.
27. Id. at 177.
28. Id. at 177-178.
29. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 92 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 630
(“there is a compelling need for legislation to overrule the Patterson decision and ensure that federal
law prohibits all race discrimination”).
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termination of contacts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms,
and condition of the contractual relationship.” 30 In its House Report, the
Committee on Education and Labor declared that section 1981(b) of the
statute was intended to prohibit all forms of racial discrimination that may
occur throughout contractual relations. 31 Accordingly, under the 1991
amendments, employees can now use section 1981 for post-contract formation conduct.
Once it was settled that section 1981 applied to private acts of discrimination, employment contracts, and discriminatory acts made after a
contract’s formation, the Supreme Court endorsed the consensus of the
federal courts of appeals that section 1981, as amended, also encompassed
retaliation claims. 32 With this last pillar in place, employees had a solid
framework for claims of discrimination and retaliation under section 1981.
II. DETERMINING EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR DISCRIMINATION UNDER
SECTION 1981
A. Courts Use Agency Law to Assign Liability
Now that it is well established that section 1981 has a home in employment discrimination law, the question remains: who is liable for racial
discrimination in the workplace, the employer or its individual employees
and agents?
Before the Civil Rights Act of 1964, some employers knowingly and
openly adopted discriminatory policies. The legal landscape was such that
racial discrimination by an employer was considered private conduct, outside the purview of federal regulation.33 Today, however, it is highly unlikely that a company’s board of directors would unanimously vote for an
openly discriminatory company policy or procedure. The more common
scenario is when a mid-level supervisor or manager discriminates against a
lower-level employee. Supervisors are the ones who interact with employees on a daily basis. They develop relationships—both good and bad—with
their subordinates. Company presidents, CEOs, and boards of directors are
often far removed from day-to-day workplace occurrences and staff interactions.

30. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2013).
31. Suzanne E. Riley, Employees’ Retaliation Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981: Ramifications of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 579, 594 (1996) referencing H.R. Rep. No. 40(I) at 90
(1991).
32. CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 451 (2008).
33. See discussion supra pp. 416-19.
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In such a corporate structure, the employing entity does not overtly
endorse, or in some cases, does not even know about a supervisor’s discriminatory animus. However, when individual supervisors discriminate,
the legally responsible actor will usually be the employer. This is because
when faced with cases of employment discrimination, courts typically turn
to some form of vicarious liability to determine who should be liable to the
aggrieved party. 34 Specifically, the Supreme Court endorses agency theory
as the preferable method of determining liability for a supervisor’s discrimination. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, a female bank employee alleged her supervisor was discriminating against her based on her sex by
sexually harassing her. 35 To determine whether the employer was liable
under Title VII for the actions of a supervisor, the Supreme Court relied on
the principles of agency theory. 36 The Court avoided a bright-line rule that
employers are always liable for a supervisor’s acts of sexual harassment
against employees, but denied a motion to dismiss the case because the
supervisor in question was an agent of the bank, and as such, the principal/bank might be liable. 37
A decade later, the Supreme Court again relied on agency principles
for deciding issues of employment discrimination in Burlington Industries,
Inc. v. Ellerth. 38 That case was also brought under Title VII. 39 The Court
highlighted Congress’ explicit instructions to interpret Title VII based on
agency principles. 40 Once the Court made that determination, it had to
decide which agency principles should win the day—those of common law
or individual state law. 41 Ultimately, in order to give uniform meaning to
Title VII’s terms, the Court elected to use the general common law of
agency rather than those of any particular state. 42
Within the context of the common law agency doctrine, the Burlington
Court likened sex discrimination to an intentional tort and thus determined
that liability turns on whether the agent was acting within the scope of his
employment. 43 In applying scope of employment principles to intentional
34. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 743 (1998) (analogizing to principles of
agency law because the term “employer” is defined under Title VII to include “agents”); Meritor Sav.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (stating that “Congress wanted courts to look to agency
principles for guidance”).
35. 477 U.S. at 57.
36. Id. at 72.
37. Id.
38. 524 U.S. at 754.
39. Id. at 742.
40. Id. at 754.
41. Id. at 755.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 756.
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torts, the Court noted, “it is less likely that a willful tort will properly be
held to be in the course of employment.” 44 The Burlington Court also
pointed out that a tort committed while “[a]cting purely from personal ill
will” is not within the scope of employment. 45 Accordingly, an employer’s
liability for a supervisor’s intentional discrimination was generally more
limited. 46
On the other hand, the Restatement defines conduct, including that of
an intentional tort, to be within the scope of employment when “actuated,
at least in part, by a purpose to serve the [employer],” even if it is forbidden
by the employer. 47 To that end, the Court acknowledged that misguided
supervisors who intentionally discriminate may be violating company policy, but could be doing so with the overall intent to serve the best interests
of the company. 48 In such a case, under the common law of agency, the
employing entity bears the legal responsibility for the supervisor’s discrimination. 49 Therefore, a supervisor’s motivation and intent are often crucial
considerations for determining liability.
In other cases, however, whether the supervisor discriminates “for the
good of his employer” is irrelevant. For example, the Fifth Circuit considered a supervisor to be acting within the scope of employment whenever he
was at work. 50 Whether or not the supervisor intended his discrimination to
further his employer’s interests was not a factor the Fifth Circuit considered
in determining an employer’s liability for a supervisor’s misconduct on the
job. 51
In summary, under Title VII, the statute under which most employment discrimination law has developed, and which has been used as a template to interpret section 1981, employers can be liable for the

44. Id. (quoting FLOYD R. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 394, at 266 (Philip
Mechem ed., 4th ed. 1952)).
45. Id. at 757 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 235 illus. 2. (1958)).
46. See id. at 756.
47. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 228(1)(c), 230 (1958)).
48. The Court supported this idea with the following example from Prosser and Keeton on Torts
§ 70, at 505-06: “[W]hen a salesperson lies to a customer to make a sale, the tortious conduct is within
the scope of employment because it benefits the employer by increasing sales, even though it may
violate the employer’s policies. . . ” Burlington, 524 U.S. at 756 (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, W. PAGE
KEETON, DAN DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 70,
at 505-06 (5th ed. 1984)).
49. Id.
50. Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 207 F.3d 803, 810 (5th Cir. 2000) (determining that there are many
factors courts should consider when an employee is acting within the scope of his employment, most of
which turn on whether the employee was actually at work).
51. See id.
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discriminatory acts of its agents such as supervisors, particularly when such
agents are acting within the scope of their employment.
B. Agency Law Allows for “Cat’s Paw” Liability
The Seventh Circuit deserves special credit for helping hammer out
more specific contours of employer liability for a supervisor’s discrimination. In Shager v. Upjohn Company, the Seventh Circuit spawned a new
theory of employer liability it referred to as “cat’s paw” liability. 52 The
term “cat’s paw” derives from the fable of the monkey and the cat by Jean
de La Fontaine. 53 The fable, also adopted and retold by Aesop, describes a
conniving monkey that wants to eat chestnuts roasting in a nearby fire.54
Unwilling to risk burning itself in order to retrieve the chestnuts, the monkey instead convinces a cat to do his bidding. 55 As the cat repeatedly burns
its paws retrieving the chestnuts from the fire, the monkey sits back unharmed, gobbling up all the chestnuts. 56
The lessons of that fable struck a chord with the Seventh Circuit as the
court discussed the plight of Ralph Shager, a sales representative for
Upjohn Company, who brought suit for age discrimination against his employer after he was fired. 57 Shager was in his early fifties while he worked
at Upjohn. 58 Shager’s supervisor was John Lehnst, who, at 35 years old,
was the youngest district manager at the company. 59 Shager claimed
Lehnst discriminated against him by assigning him to difficult sales territories, rating his work performance as marginal even when he exceeded his
quotas, and consistently making derogatory remarks about his age.60 Finally, Lehnst recommended to the company’s personnel committee that
Shager be terminated. 61 Relying on Lehnst’s input, the committee fired
Shager. 62
The court determined that discrimination is an intentional tort and reiterated that at common law, employers are liable for the intentional torts of

52. Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990).
53. See EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476, 484 (10th Cir.
2006) (describing the La Fontaine fable), cert. dismissed, 549 U.S. 1334 (2007).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Shager, 913 F.2d at 399.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 400.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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employees committed in furtherance of their employment. 63 In applying
this rule to Title VII, the court concluded that a supervisory employee who
fires a subordinate is “doing the kind of thing that he is authorized to do,
and the wrongful intent with which he does it does not carry his behavior
so far beyond the orbit of his responsibilities as to excuse the employer.”64
In cases like Shager’s, where a personnel committee terminates someone
after relying on the input of a discriminating supervisor, the committee acts
as the “cat’s paw” for the malicious monkey. 65 That the committee, and
ultimately the employer, lack discriminatory intent does not shield the employer from liability. 66
The notion of “cat’s paw” liability lit up the district and appellate
courts for a solid decade, with decisions coming down on all sides of the
issue. In Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Management, the Fourth Circuit
rejected cases like Shager and its progeny that adopt the “cat’s paw” theory. The Fourth Circuit argued that courts in those cases “have not always
described the theory in consistent ways, and rarely have they done so after
a discussion of the agency principles from which the theory emerged and
that limit its application.” 67 Instead, the Hill court permitted a recovery
only for the biased actions of the “actual decisionmaker,” not for the bias of
the supervisor who may influence the ultimate employment decision. 68
In stark contrast, the Third Circuit allowed recovery against the employer as long as the employee could establish that “those exhibiting discriminatory animus influenced or participated in the decision to
terminate.” 69 Similarly in the Ninth Circuit, courts will find an employer
liable where a “biased subordinate influenced or was involved in the decision or decision making process.” 70 In those jurisdictions, it is unnecessary
to prove the ultimate decision maker was aware of the supervisor’s discriminatory intent. The sole issue is whether the supervisor had any impact on
the decision that constitutes an adverse employment action.
C. The Supreme Court Endorses “Cat’s Paw” Liability
In 2000, the Supreme Court implicitly endorsed the “cat’s paw” concept, that employer ignorance about a supervisor’s discriminatory intent is
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 404.
Id.
Id. at 405.
Id.
Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 290 (4th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 291.
Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 286 (3d Cir. 2001).
Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007).

424

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 89:1

no shield against liability. In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,
there was no evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the official decision
maker personally harbored any discriminatory animus.71 Instead, the plaintiff presented evidence that a supervisor, who was also the official decision
maker’s husband, was biased against the employee because of his age.72
The biased supervisor complained to his wife that the older worker had
falsified work documents.73 The wife then fired the plaintiff based on the
untrue allegation without any knowledge of the supervisor’s bias. 74 The
Court held the employer liable because the biased supervisor essentially
had acted as the “actual decision maker.” 75 Due to his relationship with the
decision maker (his wife), the supervisor had considerable influence over
her and ultimately the plaintiff. As such, the effect of the supervisor’s discrimination was the same as if he had actually made the decision himself.
More recently, in Staub v. Proctor, the Supreme Court explicitly endorsed “cat’s paw” liability. 76 Like Shager, this case also came up through
the Seventh Circuit and presented a classic “cat’s paw” scenario. Staub was
an angiography technologist at Proctor Hospital and a member of the army
reserve. 77 His supervisor, Janice Mulally, harbored a strong anti-military
and anti-reservist bias. 78 She recommended to the vice president of human
resources that Staub be fired for allegedly leaving his work area without
informing a supervisor.79 The vice president of human resources did not
investigate the alleged infraction. 80 Rather, she terminated Staub’s employment based almost entirely on the biased supervisor’s underlying recommendation. 81 As the ultimate decision maker, the vice president of
human resources did not know about or share in the supervisor’s bias. 82
Once again, relying on the tenets of agency law, the Supreme Court
held the employer liable because one of its agents committed an action
based on discriminatory animus that was intended to cause, and did in fact
cause, an adverse employment decision. 83 Since the supervisor was an
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 134 (2000).
Id. at 151-52.
Id. at 137-38.
Id. at 152.
Id.
Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011).
Id. at 1189.
Id.
Id. at 1189-90.
Id. at 1189.
Id. at 1189-90.
Id.
Id. at 1193.
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agent of the employer when she caused an adverse employment action, the
employer caused it; and when discrimination was a motivating factor in her
doing so, it was a “motivating factor in the employer’s action.” 84
The Court’s reasoning is extremely pertinent to the discussion of individual supervisor liability under section 1981, because in Staub, causation
was a major element at issue. 85 It was important to the Court that the supervisor both intended to cause and actually caused the adverse employment action before the employer could be liable. 86 In such cases, the
guiltier the supervisor, the more likely his employer will be on the hook for
his misdeeds. For plaintiffs claiming discrimination under statutes other
than section 1981, the stronger the case they build against the supervisors,
the more likely the courts will impute liability to the employer instead. As
will be discussed in Part III, this will not be the case for plaintiffs in section
1981 claims after Smith v. Bray.
Although the Supreme Court cases discussed in this section of this
comment do not address specifically employer liability under section 1981,
the general rules and approaches of all the cases of each court have been
clear: agency principles govern employment discrimination. When a discriminating supervisor acts within the scope of his employment, the employer is vicariously liable, even when the employer is entirely ignorant of
the supervisor’s bias. 87
D. Before Smith v. Bray Courts Did Not Extend 1981 Liability to Supervisors
As mentioned above, there are only a few Supreme Court cases that
have discussed section 1981 in any context, let alone in an employment
discrimination law context. It is therefore unsurprising that the Supreme
Court has never ruled whether supervisors can be individually liable under
that law. And in Smith v. Bray, the Seventh Circuit became the first circuit
to extend liability to individual supervisors for retaliation under 1981. 88
In Smith, plaintiff Darrel Smith alleged “he endured serious racial harassment from his immediate supervisor at former defendant Equistar
Chemicals, LP, and was fired for complaining about it.” 89 He subsequently
84. Id.
85. See id. at 1192.
86. Id. at 1193.
87. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756 (1998); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). Keep in mind that sex harassment is likely to be for completely personal reasons and therefore not within the scope of employment.
88. Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 899 (7th Cir. 2012).
89. Id. at 892.
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filed suit for unlawful discrimination and retaliation. Because Equistar
Chemicals had recently gone through bankruptcy, it was judgment proof
and Smith could not recover from his former employer. 90 Instead, he
sought relief from two individuals who worked at the company and who
were directly responsible for his termination. In a question of first impression, the circuit court determined whether a subordinate with a retaliatory
motive could be individually liable under section 1981 for causing the employer to retaliate against another employee. 91
In reaching its holding, the Seventh Circuit reminisced that many circuits, itself included, have held or assumed that a “cat’s paw” theory will
support holding the employer vicariously liable under both section 1981
and section 1983, which applies to local governmental entities (and state
and local government employees sued in their official capacities).92 But the
court struggled to articulate why holding employers liable under 1981 also
meant supervisors should be liable too.
Further extending the fable analogy and pointing to “good” and “bad”
actors, the Smith court described supervisor liability as a principle of fairness: why should the “hapless cat” (the employer) get burned but not the
malicious “monkey” (the supervisor)? 93 Without basis in the law, but instead analogizing to moralistic story-telling, the court determined that it
“logically follows” that individual supervisors can be liable under section
1981 for conduct that exposes their employers to liability. 94 The court
rounded out its scant analysis by comparing section 1981 with section
1983, which does allow for individual supervisor liability. 95
The reasons discussed by the court fail to provide a compelling reason
to expand supervisor liability under section 1981 for the first time. The next
section of this note discusses four reasons why the Seventh Circuit reached
the wrong result.
III. FOUR REASONS WHY SMITH V. BRAY WAS WRONGLY DECIDED AND
SUPERVISORS SHOULD NOT BE HELD INDIVIDUALLY LIABLE UNDER
SECTION 1981
From the time it was born in the Seventh Circuit in 1990 to the time it
graduated from the Supreme Court in 2011, the courts have struggled with
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 892
Id. at 899.
Id. at 897-98.
Id.at 899.
Id.
Id.
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the concept of “cat’s paw” liability. As discussed in Part II of this comment, some circuits try very hard to find a way to hold the employer liable
for the discriminatory or retaliatory animus of supervisors. Other circuits
shy away from “cat’s paw” liability or at least require a strong causal link
between the supervisor’s actions and the ultimate adverse employment
action. In any event, jurisprudence in employment discrimination law unequivocally supports the idea that the employer is generally responsible for
the discrimination of its supervisors. Courts from the lowest to the highest
rely on agency principles to impute this liability on to the employer. Now,
in Smith v. Bray, the Seventh Circuit has opened the door to another class
of defendants: the biased supervisors. This part of the comment argues
against that position for four reasons.
A. Section 1981 and Title VII Are Analogous and Title VII Does Not Allow
Individual Liability
Title VII and section 1981 share a common goal. Both statutes further
the same purpose of stamping out racial discrimination. 96 Over decades of
employment discrimination jurisprudence, courts have determined that the
two similar statutes should be analyzed the same way for establishing liability. 97 Both Title VII and section 1981 are noticeably silent regarding
supervisor liability, but this section of the comment explains that Title VII
has been repeatedly interpreted to disallow it. Because section 1981 is supposed to be analyzed the same way as Title VII, there is also a strong argument against individual liability under 1981.
1. Courts analyze section 1981 the same as Title VII
In Smith, the Seventh Circuit admitted that section 1981 jurisprudence
is supposed to parallel Title VII. 98 On this particular point, the Seventh
Circuit got it right. Even though the statutes and remedies are distinct, the
analysis for determining whether a defendant intentionally interfered with
an employment contract under section 1981 is the same as Title VII. 99 Parallel treatment of the two like-minded statues has been articulated and endorsed by nearly every circuit. 100
96. Compare discussion in Part I regarding Congress’ intended goal for section 1981, with 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (2013).
97. See infra note 100.
98. Smith, 681 F.3d at 899.
99. Ferrill v. Parker Grp., Inc., 967 F. Supp. 472, 474 (N.D. Ala. 1997) aff’d, 168 F.3d 468 (11th
Cir. 1999).
100. See e.g., Jackson v. Watkins, 619 F.3d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding claims “brought
pursuant to Title VII and § 1981 are governed by the same evidentiary framework,” such that the anal-
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Although the statutes are often used together, section 1981 can be and
is used alone. Section 1981, while protecting similar rights as Title VII,
presents a number of advantages over Title VII: longer statute of limitations, no cap on damages, and no required exhaustion of administrative
remedies. 101 As will be discussed more thoroughly in the next section,
these differences between the statutes may indeed persuade a plaintiff to
file suit under section 1981 but not under Title VII. But even when a plaintiff brings a section 1981 claim without an accompanying Title VII claim,
courts still use the same analytical framework they would have if a Title
VII claim been brought. 102 Congress wanted plaintiffs to have options
when deciding what action to take against their employers. 103 Title VII was
not intended to preclude the applicability of other laws to employment
discrimination. In fact, “Congress . . . rejected an amendment to Title VII
that would have rendered section 1981 unavailable as a remedy for employment discrimination . . . .” 104
2. Title VII does not allow for individual liability
Starting from the premise that section 1981 cases should be treated the
same as Title VII for determining liability in cases of racial discrimination,

yses under both statutes are substantively the same”); Hobbs v. City of Chicago, 573 F.3d 454 (7th Cir.
2009) (holding § 1981 and Title VII claims can be analyzed together because they both require the
plaintiff to prove the same prima facie elements); Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223
F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir. 2000) (analogizing a § 1981 claim to a Title VII claim); Danco, Inc. v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 178 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that the language in § 1981(b) “tracks language of
Title VII prohibiting discrimination with respect to ‘compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment’ “); Stand v. A.B.E.L. Serv., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding both
statutes have the same requirements of proof and use the same analytical framework, therefore should
be analyzed in the same way); Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1056 (8th Cir.1997) (noting that
the McDonnell Douglas analysis is applicable to both Title VII disparate treatment and § 1981 claims);
EEOC v. Inland Marine Indus., 729 F.2d 1229, 1233 n.7 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that a plaintiff must
meet the same standards in proving a § 1981 claim that he must meet in establishing a claim under Title
VII ).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2013). See also Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369,
382-83 (2004) (determining that section 1981 claims arising out of the amendments contained in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 are governed by federal “catch-all” four-year statute of limitations period for
claims “arising under an Act of Congress enacted”); Johnson v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 653 F.3d 1000, 1006
(9th Cir. 2011), as amended (Aug. 19, 2011) (determining that retaliation claims under section 1981 are
subject to the same four-year statute of limitations).
102. See, e.g., Smith, 681 F.3d at 896 (applying Title VII framework for a section 1981 claim
because “[t]he substantive standards and methods of proof that apply to claims of racial discrimination
and retaliation under Title VII also apply to claims under § 1981”); Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126,
1134 (10th Cir. 1999) (analyzing a section 1981 using the McDonnell Douglas framework even though
there was no accompanying Title VII claim).
103. Riley, supra note 31, at 584.
104. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 201 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the argument in favor of individual supervisor liability begins to break
down because Title VII does not allow for individual liability. 105
One of the goals of employment discrimination laws is to prevent illegal discrimination before it ever happens. The remedial scheme of Title VII
serves the “dual purposes of compensating victims of illegal employment
discrimination for their losses and deterring future discriminatory conduct.” 106 Congress elected to further these goals without overburdening
small businesses by limiting liability to employers with fifteen or more
employees. 107 In light of this decision to “protect small entities with limited
resources from liability, it is inconceivable that Congress intended to allow
civil liability to run against individual employees.” 108
Moreover, the language of Title VII does little to support individual
liability. Although the statute includes an employer’s agents in the definition of employer, 109 most appellate courts that have considered individual
liability under Title VII have rejected “plain language” arguments in its
favor. 110 Instead, it has been determined that the “any agent” language was
included in the definition of employer to ensure courts rely on respondeat
superior to allow liability to pass through the supervisor to the employer. 111
It may be argued that individual supervisor liability should be allowed
in those instances where the employer is bankrupt or otherwise judgmentproof. 112 Without individual liability, plaintiffs in such cases are left without an avenue for recovery. In recent history, however, the Seventh Circuit
was not persuaded by that argument. In EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., the court rejected individual liability under the ADA, even when

105. “Congress never intended individual liability. First, at the time it defined ‘employer’ in the
ADA, Title VII, and the ADEA, Congress granted only remedies that an employing entity, not an
individual, could provide. It is a long stretch to conclude that Congress silently intended to abruptly
change its earlier vision through an amendment to the remedial portions of the statute alone.” EEOC v.
AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1281 (7th Cir. 1995). See also Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d
402, 403-04, n.4 (11th Cir.1995); see also Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 651-53 (5th Cir. 1994);
Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l. Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1993).
106. Henry P. Ting, Who’s the Boss?: Personal Liability Under Title VII and the ADEA, 5
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 515, 548 (1996).
107. “Congress did not want to burden small entities with the costs associated with litigating
discrimination claims.” Miller, 991 F.2d at 587.
108. Id.
109. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (2013).
110. Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 1995); Grant, 21 F.3d at 652; and Miller, 991
F.2d at 587.
111. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587.
112. As discussed in the next paragraph, the plaintiff made this same argument in Williams v.
Banning, which the Seventh Circuit ultimately rejected. 72 F.3d at 554-56.
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the employer was judgment-proof. 113 That court noted that while it is true
that plaintiffs with judgment-proof employers are left without recourse that
was not a good enough reason to upset the structure Congress set up. 114
Congress clearly intended to preclude small businesses and sole proprietors
from carrying the heavy financial burden of litigating discrimination
suits. 115 If small businesses are considered too strapped for resources to
litigate these claims, it only makes sense that individuals would be too.
Mere months after AIC Security, the Seventh Circuit invoked that
case’s reasoning in order to once again reject individual liability—this time
under Title VII. 116 In that case, the employer was not bankrupt, but still
“judgment-proof” in that it was innocent of any wrongdoing. 117 The court
concluded that regardless of why an employer escaped judgment, a plaintiff
could not sue individual supervisors under Title VII. 118 Ultimately, the
court could not justify allowing individual liability under Title VII, even if
it meant that a plaintiff would be left without redress. 119 Admittedly, the
purpose of Title VII is to deter potential employment discrimination, but a
court may not expand liability onto another class of persons (supervisors)
merely to meet that purpose in the absence of a congressional directive. 120
B. Sections 1981 and 1983 Are Not Analogous
To round out its analysis in Smith, the Seventh Circuit referred to a
handful of districts that have imposed individual supervisor liability in
section 1983 cases. 121 The court did not expound on why a few districts’
decisions regarding individual liability under section 1983 should have any
bearing on individual liability under section 1981. Instead, the court briefly
mentioned that, in general, the same standards govern intentional discrimination claims under Title VII, section 1981, and section 1983.122 The court

113. EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1282 n.9 (7th Cir. 1995).
114. Id.
115. The Federal Judicial Center reported last year that pursuing a civil action in federal court
costs an average of $15,000. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUD. CTR., CASE-BASED
CIVIL RULES SURVEY 36 (2009).
116. Banning, 72 F.3d at 555.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Lowry v. Clark, 843 F. Supp. 228, 231 (E.D. Ky. 1994).
121. For a complete list of the cases see Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 898-99 (7th Cir. 2012).
122. Id. at 899.
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determined that recognizing individual “cat’s paw” liability under section
1981 is thus consistent with the parallel approaches to these statutes. 123
However, the court’s analogy between theses statutes is deeply
flawed. For instance, the court apparently ignored the fact that Title VII
does not allow for individual liability when concluding that treating all
three statutes the same should lead to individual liability under section
1981. If all statutes are supposed to be analyzed the same way, none should
allow individual liability because Title VII does not. More importantly, the
court failed to recognize key distinctions between 1983 and 1981. In order
to establish liability under section 1983, a plaintiff must show (a) that the
defendant is a “person” acting under the color of state law, and (b) that the
defendant caused the plaintiff to be deprived of a federal right.124 First and
foremost, unlike section 1981, the language of the section 1983 allows—in
fact requires—a “person” to be the defendant. Second, the discriminatory
act must be committed by someone acting in their official government capacity, which unlike 1981, precludes suits against private sector employers.
Moreover, state government entities and state officials in their official
capacities are not considered persons under section 1983; they are immune
from such suits. 125 Thus, if a plaintiff wants to bring a section 1983 claim
against a state official, he or she must name the defendants in their personal
capacities rather than in their professional capacities.126 Therefore, it
makes sense to allow for individual supervisor liability under 1983. State
government entities are immune from suit. The only permissible defendants
are individual employees. 127 This is not the case for section 1981 claims,
which can be and traditionally are brought against the employer. Despite
these key differences between the statutes, the court concluded what may
be allowed under one should be allowed under the other.
C. The Decision’s Holding Conflicts with Underpinnings of Supervisory
Liability: Tort, Contract, and Agency Law
As discussed in Part I, the Supreme Court in Railway Express determined that section 1981 was applicable to claims of employment discrimi123. Id. The court apparently ignored the fact that Title VII does not allow for individual liability
in reaching this conclusion.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2013).
125. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
126. Id.
127. Municipalities may be liable under Section 1983, but not on a theory of respondeat superior.
Rather, to establish liability against a municipal government entity, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a
deprivation of a federal right occurred as a result of a “policy” of the municipal government. Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 659 (1978).
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nation because section 1981 applies to employment contracts. In reaching
that decision, the Court relied on the reasoning of a number of lower courts
that the right afforded by section 1981 to make and enforce contracts logically includes employment contracts. 128 In one of those lower court decisions, the Third Circuit noted “recently emancipated slaves had little or
nothing other than their personal services about which to contract.” 129 The
court opined that “[i]n the context of the Reconstruction it would be hard to
imagine to what contract right the Congress was more likely to have been
referring.” 130 The court wondered, “[i]f such contracts were not included,
what was?” 131
The Sixth Circuit took a similar view that section 1981 was “intended
to uproot the institution of slavery and to eradicate its badges and incidents.” 132 Through this lens, the court viewed employment discrimination
based on race an absolute violation of a person’s right to contract with an
employer. 133 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit was not persuaded that Congress’ failure to expressly mention employment contracts removed them
from the statute’s purview. 134 The court there parsed the statute’s legislative history for evidence of Congress’ concern for black laborers’ right to
contract. 135
One of several examples referenced in the court’s opinion was the
statement Representative Windom gave to the House: “Its object is to secure to a poor, weak class of laborers the right to make contracts for their
labor, the power to enforce the payment of their wages, and the means of
holding and enjoying the proceeds of their toil.” 136 To the court’s mind,
such references irrefutably explained the purpose of the statute encompassed employment contracts. 137 Thus section 1981 jurisprudence
acknowledges that employment contracts are protected under—and likely
the purpose of—section 1981.
Such thinking does not comport with individual supervisor liability
under the statute. The Seventh Circuit concluded in Smith v. Bray that it
“logically follows” that the supervisor should be individually liable for the

128. Johnson, v. Railway Exp. Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1979).
129. Young v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Co, 438 F.2d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1971).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500, 504-05 (6th Cir. 1974).
133. Id. at 505.
134. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Intl. Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476, 483 (7th Cir. 1970).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 483.
137. Id.
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same behavior that would expose his employer to liability. But according to
the Second Restatement of Torts:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of
a contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the
contract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting
to the other from the failure of the third person to perform the contract. 138

When a supervisor induces an employer to fire an employee, that supervisor has, in a sense, interfered with the employment contract between
the latter two parties. Admittedly, there is a certain logic to holding the
supervisory individually liable for tortuous interference with the employment contract. Under such reasoning, the supervisor might be guilty of
violating the employee’s constitutional right to enforce his employment.
However, agency law is a guiding light for employment discrimination law, and a supervisor is considered to be an agent of the employer.139
What logically follows, therefore, is that the agent/supervisor and the principal/employer are considered to be one entity. 140 Because they are one
entity, an employer’s agents cannot, as a matter of law, tortuously interfere
with the employer’s employment contracts except in those limited circumstances when the agent is considered a third party to the contract. 141
An agent may constitute a third party when he acts outside the scope
of his employment. 142 However, the moment the supervisory strays from
the business of the employer and commits an independent trespass, the
employer is not liable. At that moment, the agent is no longer acting within
the scope of his authority in the business of the principal, but in the furtherance of his own ends. 143 Contrary to the Seventh Circuit’s assertion, it is
decidedly illogical that both the supervisor and the employer would be
liable for the conduct of the supervisor.144 Either the supervisor was acting
in the scope of his employment and the employer is liable, or he was acting
in furtherance of his own interest and the employer escapes liability.
Under the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Smith v. Bray, plaintiffs with a
“cat’s paw” fact pattern may be forced to choose between two scenarios:
suing the supervisor for acting outside the scope of his employment, which
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979).
139. Souter v. Scott & White Mem’l Hosp., 105 F.3d 656, 659 (5th Cir. 1996).
140. See id.
141. 82 AM. JUR. 2D Wrongful Discharge § 163 (2013).
142. As discussed in Part IIA, in order for an employer and the agent to be considered one entity
under respondeat superior, the agent’s transgressing conduct must be within his scope of employment.
143. Doe v. Sipper, 821 F. Supp. 2d 384, 387-88 (D.D.C. 2011).
144. See Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 899 (7th Cir. 2012).
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led to tortuous interference with contractual rights actionable under Section
1981; or suing the employer under the theory that the supervisor was acting
within the scope of employment. The first scenario may satiate the thirst for
individual accountability for bad behavior, but the second scenario is more
likely to lead to actual compensation for the harm done.
In one respect, adding individual liability for supervisors adds an arrow to an employee’s quiver, because it creates another potential defendant. However, in a much more practical respect, supervisor liability adds a
great deal to the employer’s arsenal as well. Employers may seize this opportunity to escape liability on a technicality. Whenever faced with a discrimination suit, employers may now argue that the supervisor was acting
outside the scope of his employment at the time of the discrimination. Such
a framework leaves plaintiffs with supervisor defendants who are, in the
vast majority of cases, likely unable to compensate them.
In summary, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, contrary to the
Smith court’s assertion, it makes no logical sense to hold the supervisor
individually liable as another defendant in a general section 1981 case and
controversy. Supervisors, when acting within the scope of their employment, act on behalf of the employer. As such, it is the employer and not the
supervisor who is liable. Even if the supervisor in some way interferes with
the plaintiff’s contractual rights with the employer, the supervisor must be
considered a third party and not an agent or employee of the employer. In
such a case, the employer may be completely off the hook, an outcome that
seems contrary to the objectives of any policy that attempts to eradicate
discrimination in employment relations.
D. Supervisors Should Escape Individual Liability Lest They Be Chilled
From Making Crucial Recommendations to Employers
Removing supervisors from the purview of section 1981 gives supervisors the freedom they need to effectively do their jobs. Upper level management may or may not personally know all of the employees on the
workforce. Day-to-day personnel management is often assigned to a supervisory staff. When it comes time to decide whom to promote, whom to lay
off, and whom to transfer, the decision makers necessarily rely on input
from supervisors who better know employee performance and disciplinary
records. When supervisors know that they may face individual liability for
the ultimate decisions of the employer, they will be less efficient workers in
two ways: 1) they may be more likely to limit their interactions with employees of different races; and 2) they may be less likely to give candid
recommendations regarding employees to ultimate decision makers.
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Individual liability encourages supervisors to limit their interactions
with subordinates in order to avoid exposure to liability, particularly subordinates of another race. There is logic in the argument that if a supervisor
knows that he can be sued for discrimination or retaliation, he will be less
likely to discriminate or retaliate. This argument is sound, but it isn’t the
end of the story. From 1979 through 2006, federal plaintiffs won only 15
percent of job-discrimination cases.145 I introduce this statistical snapshot
to illustrate the point that while many discrimination cases are well founded, many others are not. 146 Supervisors know that they don’t have to actually discriminate or retaliate in order to be sued. A disgruntled employee
can bring a meritless charge for the same filing fee as meritorious ones. So
for many supervisors, the fear of facing a suit may be the same or greater
than the fear of losing a suit.
Adding to supervisor apprehension, the number of job-bias claims has
risen steadily over the past few years. From 2009 to 2010, the number of
EEOC claims filed increased seven percent to an unprecedented 99,922
claims and that number remained relatively steady in 2011 and 2012.147
While some observers attribute the higher numbers to stricter employer
regulation, 148 the increase may also be the result of workers becoming
more aware of their rights and more confident in standing up for them.
Whatever the reason for the increase, supervisors have cause for concern.
The easiest way for a supervisor to avoid a lawsuit is to avoid potential
plaintiffs, especially if there is any hint of racial tension between the supervisor and the employee. A company operates less efficiently when the supervisor feels compelled to avoid his own workers.
The next most likely impact of supervisor liability will be an influx of
unreliable communication between supervisors and decision-making, highlevel personnel. If a supervisor has a history of tension with an employee of
a different race even if the source of the tension has nothing to do with
race, that supervisor may decide to overcompensate with an undeservedly
favorable evaluation of the employee. The supervisor might think it better

145. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal
Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 109 (2009).
146. While there are many possible reasons for the low success rate of discrimination claims
during the time period listed, one possible explanation is that many of the discrimination or retaliation
claims were baseless. This possibility underscores my argument that supervisors need not actually
discriminate or retaliate in order to face a lawsuit, adding to the chill in supervisor conduct.
147. Enforcement & Litigation Statistics: Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2012, U.S.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement
/charges.cfm (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
148. Fulbright’s Litigation Trends Survey: A Little Less Litigation; More Regulation, NORTON
ROSE FULBRIGHT (October 18, 2011), http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/news/92870.
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for a sub-standard worker to get an unearned promotion than for the supervisor himself to lose his job or his savings in a discrimination or retaliation
lawsuit. Even a meritless suit will cost the supervisor time and money to
defend. And of course there is also the added aura of bigotry that may follow the supervisor around should such a suit be brought against him.
These scenarios create an inefficient workplace. Upper level management won’t be able to rely on supervisor feedback regarding personnel. As
a result, upper level management will be forced to be more involved in the
day-to-day dealings with employees; spending more time micromanaging
supervisors and less time on their own work.
The chill on supervisors will be quite cold indeed given the advantages to bringing a suit under section 1981 rather than Title VII, the
statute’s counterpart. First, section 1981 has a longer statute of limitations
than Title VII. Aggrieved employees must bring their Title VII suit within
180 days of an unlawful employment practice. 149 Under section 1981,
however, a supervisor could be on the hook for his retaliation for years
after the alleged misconduct. 150
Additionally, there are no caps on damages for actions brought under
section 1981 so employees of small businesses are especially induced to
bring an individual suit under that statute rather than a suit against the employer under Title VII, where the damages are capped based on the size of
the company. 151 Finally, unlike suits under Title VII, section 1981 claims
of discrimination do not require that plaintiffs first exhaust available administrative remedies. 152 With more time to bring a discrimination suit
against supervisors, more potential money to recover, and fewer hoops to
jump through, more plaintiffs may turn section 1981. Now that supervisors
face individual liability, they will be chilled to the bone.
CONCLUSION
Over nearly a century of carefully considered cases, section 1981 has
evolved in such as way as to fulfill its intended purposes and does not need
to keep evolving to include individual supervisor liability. Accordingly, the

149. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (e)(1) (West 2013).
150. For formation-related contract claims under § 1981, which were available even before the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, courts continue to apply state statutes of limitations (in contrast to postformation contract claims, which are governed by the four year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1658(a) (2000)). See Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382 (2004).
151. Compare 42 U.S.C. §1981a(b) (2000) (limiting awards under Title VII), with Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1979) (describing remedies under §1981).
152. Brown v. Gen. Serv. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832 (1976).
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Seventh Circuit made a mistake in Smith when it illogically held that section 1981 allows for supervisor liability.
First, section 1981 is an effective vehicle for bringing claims of employment discrimination. Its purpose and use parallel those of Title VII.
Over decades of decisions, courts have held that the two statutes should be
analyzed the same way in determining liability. Title VII does not allow for
individual supervisor liability, even in cases where the employer is bankrupt or otherwise-judgment proof. In keeping with longstanding employment discrimination jurisprudence, courts should interpret section 1981 the
same as Title VII and exempt supervisors from individual liability.
Second, the Seventh Circuit may have created a nice analogy between
section 1983 and section 1981 in order to provide for individual supervisory liability under the latter, but these two statutes are incompatible on that
particular point. The plain language of section 1983 demands an individual
defendant whereas the plain language of section 1981 is silent about individual liability. But because section l981 is supposed to parallel Title VII,
which does not allow individual liability, section 1983 jurisprudence is not
useful to import supervisory liability to section 1981.
Third, allowing supervisors to be individually liable under section
1981 does not comport with contract, agency, and tort law, all of which
form the framework for analyzing section 1981 specifically and employment discrimination generally. Because section 1981 applies to employment contracts, supervisors could potentially violate the statute when they
discriminate against an employee in a way that results in an interference
with that employment contract. But supervisors can only interfere with a
contract if they are third party to that contract. And according to agency
law—which governs employment discrimination cases—supervisors are
not third parties unless they act outside the scope of their employment. In
such a case, the employer escapes liability altogether.
Under that framework, there are two possible scenarios: either the supervisor was acting in the scope of his employment and the employer is
liable, or the supervisor was acting outside the scope of his employment
and the individual supervisor is liable. Plaintiffs will not be able to have it
both ways. To sue the supervisor in his personal capacity, the plaintiff will
have to prove that the supervisor was acting outside the scope of his job
duties, something that under existing law will be likely only in very exceptional cases.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit’s decision leaves supervisors exposed.
They will be chilled and deterred from performing their duties. If supervisors know that they could be personally sued for discrimination, they will
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take great lengths to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. The chill is
compounded by the fact that section 1981 has a longer statute of limitations
that Title VII and no cap on damages.
In light of these considerations, the Seventh Circuit reached the wrong
result in Smith v. Bray and other courts should not follow this faulty precedent.

